The events on this day in history for our heritage companies are noted below.
The earliest event was in 1955, the latest event was in 1960
One milestone event (5 to 65+ years ago)
Human Spaceflight:
NONE
Military and Classified Programs:
NONE
Exploration and Interplanetary Programs:
NONE
Earth-Monitoring and Civil Weather Satellite Programs:
NONE
Commercial Programs:
NONE
Test, ICBM, FBM programs:
1955 – Martin Titan ICBM program concept begins as an alternate configuration and staging approach to Atlas (ICBM Advisory Committee)
Other:
1959 – Vandenberg Air Force Base/Pacific (Western) Missile Range declared operational – MILESTONE: 65 years ago
1960 – An article is published in Time magazine on this day about “Titan’s Troubles”. This article was referred to me by Greg Bollendonk in late 2023 and is excerpted below. This article came less than a month after another catastrophic Titan test launch failure that was featured in the December events.
The photo today is one of the entrance signs at Vandenberg Space Force Base, renamed from Vandenberg Air Force Base with the establishment of the US Space Force. VAFB/VSFB has been operational for 65 years.
The Titan Troubles article from Time magazine – This is a DOOZY, ladies and gentlemen:
“Chairman George M. Bunker of the Martin Co. announced last week that he would take personal charge of the company’s Titan ICBM program and revamp the whole operation. All missile production, testing and launching will be brought into a new division, with headquarters shifted from Baltimore to Denver, where Martin produces the Titan. Denver’s current boss, Howard W. (“Bucky”) Merrill, will stay on as a Martin vice president, but relinquish top operational control of the Titan program to Bunker, who is moving to Denver.
“On the Pad. Bunker’s action came none too soon. The Titan, on which the U.S. has spent some $1.2 billion to date, is in trouble. After four preliminary successful shoots (none beyond the first stage), the missile designed to be more sophisticated than Convair’s Atlas has not been able to get off the pad for seven months.
“While the number of Titans built is secret, best guess is that 35 have come off the lines, of which five have been lost in accidents; another nine have been damaged, and of the nine, only two of the birds could be put back into flight condition. The accidents did not stem from any basic flaw in design. Most of the troubles came from unrelated, random-type failures that plague every missile, including the Atlas, which failed five times in a row earlier this year before the bugs were taken out. The big problem is that Martin has had not only routine troubles but so many plain, ordinary goofs. Among them: a Titan suffered ruptured tanks and ripped skin at Denver in August, when workers failed to follow specified fueling procedures, pumped fuel into the tanks at too rapid a rate. Another was severely damaged while being airlifted to Cape Canaveral in October, when Martin workers failed to open valves inside the missile so that it could “breathe” during the flight; pressure differences caused an implosion that cracked the oxygen tank.
“Pressure & Management. Part of the blame can be laid to the pressures inherent in a crash program. But as the failures pile up, Martin is getting so edgy (Martin crews call their pads at Canaveral “the inferiority complex”) that the experts accuse it of becoming “fail-safe happy,” of burdening the Titan with too many extra safety relays and circuits, gadgets that in themselves fail.
“Pressure is only part of it. More and more missilemen suspect that the real problem is Martin’s management. Critics point to a series of personnel shifts, confusion and poor morale throughout the company. At times, the troubleshooters sent out from Baltimore only stepped on each other’s toes, and compounded the trouble they were sent to fix. For some plant areas, everything operates by word of mouth. In others red tape is so thick that the head of a subdepartment must clear everything he does with his department chief. Martin’s men at Cape Canaveral are as good as any. Yet they complain of silly rules that forbid coffee or Coke breaks (one Denver scientist was recently dismissed for drinking Coke from a Thermos at his desk). Ten topnotch engineers of Martin’s missile-test group recently went looking for new jobs as a group because, as one engineer said, “I’d like to work in a happy shop for a change.”
“The Chips Are Down. The troubles have intensified in argument over whether the Air Force needs the Titan at all, especially since Convair’s Atlas has been declared “operational.” The Air Force ordered Titan for good reasons. The design for a two-stage ICBM was pushed at a time when no one could be sure that Atlas’ one-stage design would work. More over, the Air Force believed in the old-fashioned U.S. idea that competition is a good thing. As one top Air Force planner says: “You have got to have more than one, particularly when you’re working in an area where you really don’t know what you’re doing. In those days we had a lot to learn.”
“The Air Force still wants the Titan. Many military men argue that the two missiles are not duplicates, that Titan is a stronger and more sophisticated vehicle. Unlike Atlas, whose thin skin must be pressurized before the bird can stand erect, the Titan can stand upright for a long period without pressurization, can be stored underground in hard (i.e., protected) bases. It is also readily adaptable to capsule liquid refueling, which gives it a short reaction time to enemy attack. With modifications, Titan can also be used as eventual second and third stages to massive 1,000,000-lb. thrust boosters such as the upcoming Saturn; Atlas, because of its pressurized-skin construction, could never function as a second stage. Moreover, the Minuteman solid-propellant ICBM, expected to replace both the Atlas and Titan, is in the early stages of development, can easily be delayed by technical and manufacturing troubles.
“The Air Force still plans to spend $800 million on Martin’s Titan in fiscal 1961, still expects the first operational Titan by the summer of 1961 and 14 squadrons (140 missiles) in operation by the end of 1963. Nevertheless, the chips are down for Martin and Chairman Bunker. If the foul-ups and delays continue, the Air Force may be forced into a complete, and for Martin, agonizing, reappraisal of the whole program.”
From the Time magazine archives.
