The events on this day in history for our heritage companies are noted below.
The earliest event was in 1959, the latest event was in 2004
Three milestone events (5 to 65+ years ago)
Human Spaceflight:
1961 – Merritt Island selected for Saturn V launch sites
Military and Classified Programs:
NONE
Exploration and Interplanetary Programs:
2004 – LM Mars Odyssey end of primary mission – still operational as of August 2024 – MILESTONE: 20 years ago
Earth-Monitoring and Civil Weather Satellite programs:
NONE
Commercial Programs:
NONE
Test, ICBM, FBM programs:
1959 – LAUNCH: GD Atlas C, LC12, CCAFS – MILESTONE: 65 years ago
1963 – LAUNCH: GD Atlas E, OSTF1, VAFB
1978 – Accident at MM Titan II silo kills 2 and injures 35, McConnell AFB, Kansas – large oxidizer spill
1982 – LAUNCH (2): MM Pershing 1A, Fort Bliss, Texas
1984 – LAUNCH (2): Lockheed Poseidon C4, SSBN630, ETR – MILESTONE: 40 years ago
1985 – LAUNCH: MM Peacekeeper, LF08, VAFB
1987 – LAUNCH: Lockheed Trident C4, SSBN629, ETR
Other:
NONE
The photo today shows a Titan II ICBM in the silo. The photo was found on Wikipedia and is considered public domain, according to the source data. This photo is to illustrate the typical silo configuration.
Here is a story about the accident that occurred on this day in 1978. This has been excerpted from the Military Standard; no information about credits for the information were found:
Launch Complex 533-7, located just south of the small town of Rock, Kansas, had been chosen for both a Reliability and Aging Surveillance Program evaluation of the launch complex and missile airframe and a Service Life Analysis Program evaluation of the Stage I and Stage II engines. Both of these tests were part of an ongoing analysis of the Titan II program designed to replace the launching of test missiles. The missile combat crew composed of 1Lt Keith E. Matthews, MCCC; 2Lt Charles B. Frost, DMCCC; A1C Danford M. Wong, BMAT; and SrA GLEN H. Wessel, MFT, was on duty monitoring the missile recycle operation. At 1200 a two-man Propellant Transfer System team was on Level 7 in the launch duct, finishing loading the Stage I oxidizer tank of the missile. Airmen 1st Class Erby Hepstall and Carl Malinger were engaged in the final steps of disconnecting the Stage I oxidizer propellant transfer hose from the oxidizer airborne quick-disconnect fitting at the bottom of the Stage I fuel tank. At 1220 Hepstall and Malinger had nearly completely unthreaded the transfer line fitting when the airborne (missile side) quick-disconnect poppet valve failed to seal. The 13,220 gallons of nitrogen tetroxide that had just been loaded into the Stage I oxidizer tank began to gush out, forcing them to drop the oxidizer fill line. The dark red clouds of vapor quickly cut visibility to zero inside the launch duct. The airmen screamed into the Radio-Type Maintenance Network (RTMN, a radio communication system used by the launch control center and topside propellant transfer control trailer staff), “The poppet did not seat, it won’t stop, let’s get out of here.” [Note: there was a long section in the original article about the delays and bad decisions in the response to the event].
Two fatalities resulted from the accident, and 25 personnel were slightly injured. Thomas was declared dead on arrival at the hospital. The autopsy revealed that he had died from acute pulmonary edema due to inhalation of high concentration of oxidizer vapor. Subsequent investigation showed that Thomas had apparently tried to stem the flow of oxidizer from the tank with his glove. The high velocity stream of fluid penetrated the glove/cuff interface, instantaneously filling his suit with a dense cloud of vapors. Hepstall died several days later from inhalation of the oxidizer fumes. The nearby town of Rock, Kansas, was evacuated with only one person needing treatment for oxidizer inhalation.
The final report of the investigation into the accident was issued by Col Ben Scallorn on October 10th 1978. The primary cause was failure to follow recommended procedures. The actual cause of the accident was the lodging of a Teflon O right from the bottom of the oxidizer filter unit in the poppet valve mechanism, jamming it open. When Hepstall and Malinger began to disconnect the oxidizer transfer line, they had quickly unscrewed the quick-disconnect rather than follow the technical order specification that the quick-disconnect should be slowly unscrewed and if any leak was seen, screw the disconnect back to the fully connected position so that the tank could be unloaded and the quick-disconnect replaced. The filter unit had been removed during the propellant download several weeks earlier, and the lower O right was inadvertently left in place. Technical orders called for the replacement of the filter prior to oxidizer fill but this was not done.
